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 PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1483 
___________ 
 
JAMES C. RICKETTI, D.P.M., 
 
                                                     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SHAUN P. BARRY; RESTORIXHEALTH; JOHN DOES, 
D.P.M, 1-20, said names being fictitious; JOHN ROES, 1-20, 
said names being fictitious; JANE DOES, 1-20, said names 
being fictitious; ABC COS., 1-20, said names being fictitious; 
JANE DOES, D.P.M., 1-20, said names being fictitious 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3-13-cv-06804) 
District Judge:  Honorable Anne E. Thompson 
___________ 
 
Argued November 19, 2014 
 
Before:  SMITH, HARDIMAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 7, 2015) 
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Ralph B. Crelin, Esq. [Argued] 
Robert J. Conroy, Esq. 
Daniel G. Giaquinto, Esq. 
Kern, Augustine, Conroy & Schoppmann 
1120 Route 22 East 
Bridgewater, NJ 08807 
 Counsel for Appellant 
 
Robert M. Travisano, Esq. [Argued] 
Daniel R. Levy, Esq. 
Epstein, Becker & Green 
One Gateway Center 
Newark, NJ 07102 
 Counsel for Appellees 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
James Ricketti appeals an order of the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his 
civil action against Shaun Barry and RestorixHealth. The 
Court dismissed the suit pursuant to New Jersey’s entire 
controversy doctrine, a state rule of procedure that 
discourages successive litigation concerning the same subject 
matter. Because the District Court did not conduct the inquiry 
required by New Jersey law, we will vacate its order and 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
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I 
Dr. Ricketti, a podiatrist based in Hamilton Township, 
New Jersey, hired Dr. Michael Plishchuk in 2008 to work as 
an associate. In addition to maintaining his own practice, 
Ricketti treated patients at a local wound care center run by 
Shaun Barry on behalf of his employer, RestorixHealth 
(formerly the Center for Wound Healing, Inc.). Ricketti 
regularly sent Plishchuk to the wound care center to treat 
patients. 
Ricketti terminated Plishchuk’s employment in July 
2012 for allegedly failing to comply with certain legal and 
regulatory requirements. According to Ricketti, Plishchuk 
continued treating Ricketti’s patients at the wound care center 
even after he was fired, which deprived Ricketti “of revenue 
to which he was entitled for the treatment rendered to these 
patients.” App. 12. After Plishchuk stopped treating patients 
at the center, Barry allegedly prevented Ricketti from 
practicing there because all of his patients had been healed. 
Ricketti sued Plishchuk in New Jersey state court later 
in July 2012, claiming breach of contract, breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference 
with economic advantage, breach of the duty of loyalty, and 
conversion. His complaint was based primarily on 
Plishchuk’s alleged diversion of patients at the wound care 
center to himself and his interference with the treatment of 
patients at the center by Ricketti’s other associates. The suit 
also included claims based on the grounds for Ricketti’s 
termination of Plishchuk’s employment. Critical to this 
appeal, Ricketti did not join Barry or RestorixHealth in his 
first case, nor did he inform the state court that they should 
have been joined. App. 99, 121 (twice certifying pursuant to 
New Jersey Rule of Court 4:5-1 that “no other party should be 
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joined in this action”). In May 2013, Ricketti and Plishchuk 
reached a confidential settlement after a court-ordered 
mediation. 
 Ricketti filed a second suit in state court in September 
2013, this time naming Barry and RestorixHealth as 
defendants and omitting Plishchuk. Although Ricketti 
contends that this action was very different from the first, 
Ricketti Br. 7–8, the complaints sought relief under the same 
common law causes of action and averred mostly the same 
supporting facts, see Barry Br. 10–11 (side-by-side 
comparison of the complaints’ allegations). Defendants 
removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity of 
citizenship and filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendants argued that New 
Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine barred the suit and, in the 
alternative, that Ricketti had not pleaded the elements 
required for each of his claims. 
 The District Court granted the motion and dismissed 
the case. The Court concluded that the entire controversy 
doctrine barred Ricketti’s second suit because his “claims 
against Defendants are substantially the same as the claims 
advanced in the original litigation” and “[b]oth matters arise 
out of the same contractual provisions and obligations as well 
as the same actions.” Ricketti v. Barry, 2014 WL 546350, at 
*3 (D.N.J. Feb. 10, 2014). Barry and RestorixHealth would 
be prejudiced if forced to defend the suit, the Court found, 
because they “were prevented from participating in the 
original proceeding which involved substantially the same 
facts and issues.” Id. The District Court did not reach 
Defendants’ other arguments for dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6). Ricketti appealed.  
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 The District Court had removal jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1441 because it would have had diversity 
jurisdiction from the start under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).1 We 
have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
II 
 Our review of a district court’s application of the entire 
controversy doctrine is plenary. Venuto v. Witco Corp., 117 
F.3d 754, 758 (3d Cir. 1997). 
A 
 We have described the entire controversy doctrine as 
“New Jersey’s specific, and idiosyncratic, application of 
traditional res judicata principles.” Rycoline Prods., Inc. v. C 
& W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1997). A 
mainstay of New Jersey civil procedure, the doctrine 
encapsulates the state’s longstanding policy judgment that 
“the adjudication of a legal controversy should occur in one 
litigation in only one court[.]” Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at 
                                                
1 There was complete diversity of citizenship among 
the parties, Ricketti being a citizen of New Jersey, Barry of 
Pennsylvania, and RestorixHealth of Nevada (its state of 
incorporation) and New York (the location of its principal 
place of business). And although the complaint did not state 
an amount in controversy, the parties seem to agree that it 
exceeds $75,000 because Ricketti seeks compensation for 
“substantial” lost revenue, as well as punitive damages. App. 
23; see Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 
1046 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[P]unitive damages are properly 
considered in determining whether the jurisdictional amount 
has been satisfied.”). 
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Orange, 560 A.2d 1169, 1172 (N.J. 1989); see also N.J. 
Const. art. VI, § 3, ¶ 4 (“[L]egal and equitable relief shall be 
granted in any cause so that all matters in controversy 
between the parties may be completely determined.”); Smith 
v. Red Top Taxicab Corp., 168 A. 796, 797 (N.J. 1933) (“No 
principle of law is more firmly established than that a single 
or entire cause of action cannot be subdivided into several 
claims, and separate actions maintained thereon.”). Like its 
“blood relative[]” res judicata, the entire controversy doctrine 
is an affirmative defense, Rycoline Prods., 109 F.3d at 886, 
and it applies in federal courts “when there was a previous 
state-court action involving the same transaction,” Bennun v. 
Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Unsurprisingly, the doctrine has appeared with some 
frequency in our Court and in the District Court. See, e.g., 
Fornarotto v. Am. Waterworks Co., 144 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 
1998); Heir v. Del. River Port Auth., 218 F. Supp. 2d 627, 
632 (D.N.J. 2002). 
 The contours of the entire controversy doctrine have 
changed over time. Although it first applied only to joinder of 
claims, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Cogdell expanded it 
to include mandatory joinder of parties as well. Mitchell v. 
Procini, 752 A.2d 349, 352 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) 
(citing Cogdell, 560 A.2d at 1178). The holding in Cogdell 
was later codified in New Jersey Rule of Court 4:30A, which 
then provided: “Non-joinder of claims or parties required to 
be joined by the entire controversy doctrine shall result in the 
preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent required by the 
entire controversy doctrine[.]” Rycoline Prods., 109 F.3d at 
885. The party joinder component was criticized, and the 
New Jersey Supreme Court referred the matter to its Civil 
Practice Committee to consider revisions. See Olds v. 
Donnelly, 696 A.2d 633, 644–46 (N.J. 1997). In doing so, the 
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court laid the groundwork for the changes to come by 
“emphasiz[ing] that preclusion is a remedy of last resort” and 
stating: “If a remedy other than preclusion will vindicate the 
cost or prejudice to other parties and the judicial system, the 
court should employ such a remedy.” Id. at 645. 
 In September 1998, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
amended Rule 4:30A to eliminate the party joinder 
requirement. Kent Motor Cars, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds, 
Co., 25 A.3d 1027, 1035–36 (N.J. 2011). At the same time, it 
moved the party joinder regime to Rule 4:5-1(b)(2), which 
now provides: 
[E]ach party shall disclose . . . the names of any 
non-party who should be joined in the action 
. . . because of potential liability to any party on 
the basis of the same transactional facts. . . . If a 
party fails to comply with its obligations under 
this rule, the court may impose an appropriate 
sanction including dismissal of a successive 
action against a party whose existence was not 
disclosed or the imposition on the 
noncomplying party of litigation expenses that 
could have been avoided by compliance with 
this rule. A successive action shall not, 
however, be dismissed for failure of compliance 
with this rule unless the failure of compliance 
was inexcusable and the right of the undisclosed 
party to defend the successive action has been 
substantially prejudiced by not having been 
identified in the prior action. 
Thus, since 1998, automatic preclusion of a successive suit 
has not been the appropriate sanction in New Jersey for 
failure to join a defendant in an earlier action concerning the 
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same subject matter. The rules now contemplate less 
draconian sanctions if they will suffice and dismissal only if 
the noncompliance was “inexcusable” and “the right of the 
undisclosed party to defend” a successive action was 
“substantially prejudiced.” N.J. Ct. R. 4:5-1(b)(2).2 
 The crux of Ricketti’s appeal is that the District Court 
failed to conduct the inquiry that New Jersey’s rules have 
required since the doctrine was altered in 1998. For the 
reasons that follow, we agree. 
B 
 The record shows that the District Court applied the 
entire controversy doctrine as it existed before New Jersey 
altered its party joinder rules in 1998. The Court neither cited 
Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) nor mentioned sanctions short of dismissal.3 
                                                
2 The parties dispute whether the entire controversy 
doctrine still includes party joinder—a disagreement also 
discernible in caselaw discussing the doctrine. Compare 
Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Agusta, 178 F.3d 132, 135 n.1 
(3d Cir. 1999) (“The party joinder aspect of the doctrine . . . 
has now been eliminated.”), with Heir, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 632 
(rooting the doctrine in “several of the New Jersey Rules of 
Court,” including Rules 4:30A and 4:5-1(b)(2)). This is a 
semantic quarrel we need not settle; the point is that litigants 
invoking claim joinder as a basis for preclusion must turn to 
Rule 4:30A and those invoking party joinder must turn to 
Rule 4:5-1(b)(2). 
3 Such sanctions may include the imposition of 
litigation costs on the noncomplying party, as well as any 
others that the court finds “appropriate.” N.J. Ct. R. 4:5-
1(b)(2); see Kent Motor Cars, 25 A.3d at 1037. 
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Although the Court reviewed cases involving the entire 
controversy doctrine, those cases either predated the 1998 
modifications4 or neglected to mention them.5 As written, the 
District Court’s opinion suggests that New Jersey’s court 
rules require automatic dismissal of a successive suit 
concerning the same subject matter, even though we noted the 
1998 alterations to the entire controversy doctrine soon after 
they were implemented. See Paramount Aviation Corp. v. 
Agusta, 178 F.3d 132, 135 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 Outright dismissal of a civil action for failure to 
comply with Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) is appropriate only when: (1) 
the suit is a “successive action”; (2) the plaintiff’s failure to 
disclose the existence of other potentially liable parties in the 
earlier litigation was “inexcusable”; and (3) the undisclosed 
parties’ right to defend the successive action was 
“substantially prejudiced” by their omission. Kent Motor 
Cars, 25 A.3d at 1034; N.J. Ct. R. 4:5-1(b)(2). Even assuming 
arguendo that the District Court tacitly analyzed the first two 
requirements and found them satisfied here, it did not make 
the finding of substantial prejudice required by Rule 4:5-
1(b)(2) to justify dismissal. Instead, the Court found that 
Defendants were “prejudiced” merely because they were 
omitted from the Plishchuk action. Ricketti, 2014 WL 
                                                
4 See, e.g., Bernardsville Quarry v. Borough of 
Bernardsville, 929 F.2d 927, 930 (3d Cir. 1991); DiTrolio v. 
Antiles, 662 A.2d 494, 502 (N.J. 1995). 
5 All of the cases in this latter group were nonbinding, 
and some did not involve party joinder. See, e.g., Great W. 
Mining & Mineral Co. v. ADR Options, Inc., 533 F. App’x 
132, 135 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 10 
546350, at *3. Although we express no view as to whether 
this or any other forms of prejudice inflicted upon Barry and 
RestorixHealth may justify dismissal of Ricketti’s action 
against them, we note that the “substantial prejudice” prong 
of Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) requires a showing of more than mere 
inconvenience to the parties. See, e.g., Ctr. for Prof’l 
Advancement v. Mazzie, 347 F. Supp. 2d 150, 156 (D.N.J. 
2004) (“Substantial prejudice, as contemplated by Rule 4:5-
1(b)(2), means that a person not joined in an earlier action 
will be seriously harmed in his or her ability to maintain an 
adequate defense in a subsequent action.”); Kent Motor Cars, 
25 A.3d at 1039–40 (holding that the destruction of 
potentially relevant evidence before the filing of the 
successive action did not give rise to substantial prejudice); 
Mitchell, 752 A.2d at 355 (characterizing substantial 
prejudice as involving “specific difficulties in mounting a 
defense . . . significantly different from [those] normally 
encountered”). 
III 
 For the reasons stated, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order dismissing Ricketti’s action against Barry and 
RestorixHealth and remand the matter for further 
proceedings. On remand, the District Court should evaluate 
the party joinder issue under the summary judgment standard. 
See Rycoline Prods., 109 F.3d at 886 (holding that a motion 
to dismiss that relies on an entire-controversy defense not 
appearing on the face of the complaint must be denied 
without prejudice or converted to a motion for summary 
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d)). The 
District Court should enter judgment for Defendants on party 
joinder grounds only if the Court finds that this is a 
successive action, that Ricketti’s failure to disclose 
Defendants as potentially liable parties in the Plishchuk 
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action was inexcusable, and that this omission substantially 
prejudiced Defendants’ right to defend this action. See N.J. 
Ct. R. 4:5-1(b)(2). If that test is not satisfied, the Court may 
consider other appropriate sanctions for any prejudice Barry 
and RestorixHealth might have suffered as a result of their 
omission from Ricketti’s first suit. And finally, if judgment 
for Defendants is not warranted on party joinder grounds, the 
District Court should consider whether it is warranted on any 
of the other grounds Defendants raised in their motion to 
dismiss. 
